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In response  to increasing  calls  for  policies  to raise  the  U.S.  saving  rate, 
proposals  are  once  again  being  offered  in  Congress  to change  the  tax  base 
from  income  to consumption.  Beyond  the  important  issues  of income 
distribution  (that  is,  outright  unfairness)  inherent  in  such  a plan,  it  would 
simply  not  work.  Indeed,  it is based  on  a fundamental  mismeasurement  of 
what  counts  as  saving  in  the  U.S.  economy. 
The  logical  sequence  underlying  this  proposal  is  wrong  at two  crucial 
points:  lowering  or eliminating  taxes  on  saving  in  unlikely  to increase  saving; 
and  higher  saving  would  be  unlikely  to increase  investment  in  any  case  (and 
would,  more  likely,  decrease  investment).  The  usual  crowding-out  logic  is 
based  on limited  evidence  and  inadequate  theory. 
Finally,  the  interaction  between  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  is  currently 
perverse.  Contractionary  fiscal  policy  (which  is what  is implied  by  these 
proposals)  will  not  be  counter-balanced  by  timely  and  adequate  monetary 
stimulus.  The  Federal  Reserve  is likely  to wait  too  long  to  respond,  either 
due  to excessive  caution  about  the  effectiveness  of the  fiscal  policy  change,  or 
to  take  advantage  of an  opportunity  to lower  inflation  still  further  before 
allowing  the  economy  to recover. I’.  . .[To  institute  tax  incentives]  on  the  assumption  that  they  will 
have  commensurate  effects  in increasing  investment  must  . . . 
rest  essentially  on faith.  Faith  is indeed  sometimes  rewarded. 
But  for  our  part,  in  this  instance,  we  remain  agnostic.” 
Chirinko  and  Eisner  [1983] 
I.  Introduction 
Proposals  for  tax  reform  have  been  part  of the  American  political 
landscape  for  as long  as there  have  been  taxes.  However,  with  the 
Republican  Party  gaining  majority  status  in both  houses  of Congress  in  1995, 
a serious  political  movement  arose  to reform  the  tax  system  in  a much  more 
radical  way,  by  “tearing  the  current  system  out  by its  roots,”  in  the  words  of 
U.S.  Rep.  Bill  Archer.  The  general  idea  is that  we  should  replace  the  current 
income-tax-based  system  with  one  of a variety  of systems  intended  to improve 
the  U.S.  economy’s  long-term  growth  rate  through  the  encouragement  of 
saving,  which  is claimed  to lead  to higher  investment,  productivity, 
international  competitiveness,  and  long-run  economic  growth. 
As  radical  as  the  political  rhetoric  is,  the  basic  economic  reasoning 
behind  these  plans  is  anything  but  new.  Neo-classical  economists  have  been 
calling  for  ways  to increase  saving  for  decades.  Almost  fifty  years  ago,  Tobin 
[1949]  could  reasonably  describe  such  efforts  as having  “a  long  history.” 
Moreover,  politicians  have  taken  this  advice  to heart.  While  the  United 
States,  along  with  every  other  industrialized  country,  continues  to  use  an income  tax  system,  inducements  to saving  have  always  been  a politically- 
popular  part  of the  tax  code  (a fuller  discussion  of which  is  provided  below). 
As  is  so often  the  case,  therefore,  everything  old  in politics  is  new  again. 
There  is  another  saving  “crisis,”  and  the  tax  code  can  save  the  day. 
Most  analyses  of the  various  proposals  to date  (the  Flat  Tax,  a national 
sales  tax,  the  USATax,  etc.)  have  concentrated  on the  distributional  impact  of 
the  plans,  along  familiar  lines  of progressivity  and  regressivity.  In Buchanan 
[1996a],  I instead  analyze  the  specific  tax  reform  plans  that  have  been 
proposed  in  the  last  year  or so from  the  standpoint  of their  (un)workability 
and  their  likely  damage  to the  functioning  of national  fiscal  policy.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  Buchanan  [1996b],  I defend  the  concept  of tax  progressivity 
and  offer  proposals  for  tax  reform  that  preserve  or enhance  the  current 
progressivity  in  the  U.S.  federal  tax  code. 
Surprisingly  little  critical  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  macroeconomic 
implications  of these  tax  reform  plans,  particularly  the  claims  associated  with 
promoting  saving.  This  essay  will  offer  such  an  analysis.  Section  II describes 
some  facts  and  definitions  regarding  saving  in  the  U.S.  economy,  and  it 
provides  an  analysis  of why  the  tax  code  cannot  succeed  in  coaxing  Americans 
to  save  more.  Section  III  critiques  both  the  economic  arguments  for  raising 
saving  and  the  argument  that  the  Federal  Reserve  can  neutralize  any 
damage  that  might  ensue.  Section  IV concludes,  summarizing  the  basic 
argument  of the  paper  that  tax  code  changes  cannot  be  relied  upon  to raise 
saving,  and  that  even  if they  could  be,  increasing  saving  is  not  an  appropriate 
target  of macroeconomic  policy. 
II.  Saving  in  the  United  States 
It would  be  difficult  to find  more  agreement  about  the  desired  direction 
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with  an  opinion  on  the  subject  seems  absolutely  certain  that  saving  is 
currently  too  low  and  needs  to go up if the  future  is to be  saved  (no  pun 
intended).  The  very  repetition  of this  conclusion,  moreover,  creates  its  own 
legitimacy,  causing  those  without  a well-thought-out  opinion  on the  issue  to 
adopt  it  as  a default  and  intimidating  those  who  would  dare  to  question  this 
obvious  “truth.”  (The  companion  to this  concern,  also  broadly  condemned,  is 
the  amount  of the  nation’s  private  saving  that  is being  borrowed  by  the  public 
sector-i.e.,  The  Deficit.) 
Since  the  concept  of “saving”  is often  defined  in inconsistent  and 
contradictory  ways,  however,  it will  be  useful  and  important  to look  at 
alternative  definitions  of the  term  and  the  trends  in various  measures  of 
saving  in  the  U.S.  economy.  Among  other  things,  this  investigation  will 
show  that  the  most  inclusive  and  macroeconomically-important  saving  rates 
are  not  moving  downward,  in  spite  of what  some  misleading  statistics  have 
been  used  to  show. 
A.  Difficulties  in Defining  Consumption  and Saving 
In  discussions  of an  economy’s  rate  of saving,  it is  common  to  emphasize 
solely  the  rate  of personal  saving,  which  divides  the  average  person’s  saving 
(i.e.,  the  amount  of their  take-home  pay  that  they  do not  spend  on  goods  and 
services  each  year)  by  their  total  take-home  pay.  In  a good  example  of the 
run  of academic  papers  concerned  with  the  decline  of saving  in  the  U.S., 
Summers  and  Carroll  [1987]  analyzed  estimates  from  the  National  Income 
and  Products  Accounts  (NIPA)  and  traced  a decline  in the  personal  saving 
rate  (more  formally  described  as  the  annual  rate  of personal  saving  as  a 
percentage  of disposable  private  income).  In the  early  197Os,  this  rate averaged  over  8%,  while  it had  fallen  to near  5%  by  the  mid-1980s  or a 
decline  of more  than  one-third  from  its  initial  value.  By  1994,  according  to 
government  statistics,  the  rate  had  fallen  further,  to just  under  4%,  although 
it bounced  back  to nearly  5%  in  1995  (with  roughly  $250  billion  in  saving  and 
disposable  income  nearing  $5  trillion). 
However,  it is important  to clarify  just  what  the  term  saving  means  in 
this  context.  Saving  is  simply  computed  as the  amount  remaining  from 
disposable  income  after  subtracting  consumption,  interest  payments  made  by 
individuals,  and  money  paid  to recipients  abroad  (as  when  a worker  in the 
U.S.  sends  part  of their  income  to family  members  living  in  other  countries). 
Typically,  the  latter  category  is  minuscule  (totaling  0.2%  of  disposable  income 
in  1995),  while  the  interest  payments  category  is more  significant  (usually 
amounting  to more  than  half  of total  computed  personal  saving). 
Still,  the  vast  majority  of the  calculation  of personal  saving  amounts  to 
subtracting  personal  consumption  expenditures  from  disposable  income.  It 
turns  out,  however,  that  several  of the  items  included  in personal 
consumption  expenditures  are  hardly  examples  of profligacy.  Purchases  of 
durable  goods,  such  as  automobiles,  furniture,  and  appliances  are  counted  as 
consumption,  not  saving.  Expenditures  for education  are  similarly  counted 
as  consumption,  as  are  expenditures  on medical  care.  In  other  words,  much 
of what  consumers  do  to invest  in their  long-term  economic  well-being  is 
counted  as  consumption  rather  than  saving. 
Since  saving  will  increase  every  time  that  any  type  of consumption 
decreases  (assuming  a constant  level  of disposable  income-which  is both  a 
crucial  assumption  and  an incorrect  one),  this  means  that  a policy  which 
decreases  private  expenditures  on higher  education,  for  example,  would  be 
saving-enhancing.  It is  worth  noting  here,  therefore,  that  more  saving  should 
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meaningful  sense. 
On  some  levels,  of course,  it is perfectly  reasonable  to  define  saving  in 
the  way  that  the  government’s  statistics  do.  The  problem  is  not  the  statistics 
but  the  uses  to  which  they  are  put.  Nevertheless,  the  purest  definition  of 
saving  would  be  the  amount  of resources  produced  in the  economy  in  a given 
year  that  are  not  consumed  today  but  are  put  to use  in  a way  that  will 
provide  returns  to the  economy  in years  to  come.  (Not  coincidentally,  this  is 
also  the  purest  definition  of investment.)  The  problem  with  the  definitions 
used,  as  discussed  above,  is that  the  household  sector  is  assumed  never  to 
make  any  purchases  which  have  long-term  pay-offs.  Only  private  businesses 
are  presumed  to do  so. 
Moreover,  the  definition  of consumption  must  also  include  those  items 
that  are  consumed  even  though  they  are  not  paid  for by  direct  out-of-pocket 
costs  to the  individual.  Therefore,  health  care  and  most  other  employer- 
provided  benefits,  which  are  not  currently  taxed,  would  have  to be  taxed  at 
the  individual  level  if one  viewed  all  consumption  as bad  and  really  wanted  to 
discourage  it.  The  value  of owner-occupied  housing  would  also  have  to be 
taxed,  since  homeowners  are  assumed  to be  receiving  income  (and  making  an 
identical  consumption  expenditure)  in  the  form  of the  rent  that  they  are 
effectively  paying  to  themselves.  Middle-class  (and  especially  elderly)  people 
could  find  themselves  taxed  on  rather  large  consumption  expenditures  that 
they  never  knew  they  had  been  making. 
Looked  at from  a broader  perspective,  however,  even  personal  saving  is 
not  falling  in  the  U.S.  Block  and  Heilbroner  [1992]  analyzed  official  data  and 
found  several  areas  where  saving  is  occurring  but  is being  ignored  by  the 
government’s  statisticians.  The  largest  of these  is capital  gains 
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Indeed,  Block  and  Heilbroner  point  out  that  the  trends  in income  distribution 
in  the  United  States  in  the  past  fifteen  years  make  it hard  to believe  that 
there  could  be  a decline  in personal  saving.  Since  high-income  individuals 
are  responsible  for  the  vast  majority  of personal  saving  [see  Bunting,  1991, 
for  a detailed  distributional  analysis  of saving  behavior],  and  since  the 
distribution  of income  has  become  vastly  more  top-heavy,  it would  be  strange 
indeed  if there  were  a decline  in private  saving,  properly  measured. 
It is  noteworthy  that  Block  and  Heilbroner’s  suggested  recalculation  of 
the  NIPA  measures  of saving  match  up  remarkably  well  with  a measure  of 
saving  derived  from  the  Federal  Reserve’s  Flow  of Funds  accounts.  Personal 
saving,  appropriately  measured,  is  simply  not  falling;  and  there  is  certainly 
no  crisis  that  would  require  a complete  re-write  of the  nation’s  tax  code. 
Even  if saving  is lower  today  than  it used  to be,  however,  it is  also  not 
at  all  clear  why  it  ought  to go back  up.  Why  is more  better?  There  is  no 
systematic  analysis  available  that  tells  us  how  much  saving  we  should  be 
doing,  nor  whether  the  current  amount  is too  high  or too  low.  Indeed,  Gordon 
[1990]  argued  that  the  current  level  of saving  in the  U.S.  economy  was  just 
about  right,  even  at  the  time  when  the  standard  measures  of savings  looked 
their  worst. 
B.  Business  Saving 
More  important  even  than  the  arguments  noted  above,  however,  is  the 
absence  of business  saving  in most  analyses  of private  saving.  As  argued  in 
Levy  and  Levy  [1983],  it is business  saving  that  drives  business  investment. 
Business  saving  dwarfs  personal  saving  in  the  official  statistics,  usually 
coming  in  at  a level  three  to four  times  greater  than  personal  saving  (e.g., 
6 $814  billion  in  1994,  compared  to $192  billion  in  officially-measured  personal 
saving). 
Business  saving  is  comprised  of two  items,  undistributed  business 
profits  (also  known  as  retained  earnings)  and  capital  consumption  allowances 
(or  depreciation).  Since  depreciation  (which  is usually  at least  five  times 
greater  than  retained  earnings,  and  in  some  recent  quarters  has  been  as 
much  as ten  times  greater)  is  simply  a recognition  of the  depletion  of existing 
capital,  it might  be  argued  that  this  is really  not  saving  at  all.  However,  the 
depreciation  allowances  that  show  up  in  the  national  accounts  are  truly 
“allowances,”  i.e.,  they  represent  business  revenues  that  were  set  aside  and 
excluded  from  taxation.  Businesses  can  then  use  those  untaxed  funds  to 
purchase  new  capital.  In many  cases,  moreover,  the  new  capital  is more 
productive  than  the  old  capital  that  it replaced,  as when  an  old  computer 
system  is  replaced  with  a newer  one  (which  is  sometimes  cheaper  even  in  the 
aggregate,  much  less  per  unit  of computing  power). 
Finally,  business  saving  has  been  relatively  constant  as  a percentage  of 
disposable  income  (or  of GDP).  Therefore,  if one  wanted  to argue  that  there 
is  a crisis  in  national  saving,  it would  be  a bad  idea  to mention  business 
saving  at  all.  Business  saving  represents  the  bulk  of  saving;  and  it finances 
the  bulk  of investment  in productive  capital  (as  argued  in more  detail  below). 
Since  it has  not  fallen,  it is harder  still  to argue  that  there  is  a need  for 
drastic  action  to make  the  tax  system  more  friendly  to  saving. 
C.  Current  Inducements  to Save 
The  current  tax  system,  indeed,  already  is very  friendly  to  saving  and 
investment.  Among  the  more  well-known  attempts  to induce  saving  that 
have  been  added  to the  tax  code  in  the  past  decade  or so  are  Individual 
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all  without  any  apparent  impact  on  aggregate  personal  saving)  and  401(k) 
and  403(b)  accounts.  Anti-consumption  initiatives  have  also  been  passed, 
such  as  the  elimination  of the  deductibility  of interest  on  consumer  debt 
(which  was  followed  by  further  increases  in  consumer  debt,  casting  further 
doubt  on  the  efficacy  of these  measures  in  altering  individuals’  behavior). 
As  Eisner  [19921  notes,  most  of the  types  of saving  that  matter  are 
already  untaxed:  unrealized  and  untaxed  capital  gains,  and  untaxed  pension 
fund  contributions.  The  President’s  Council  of Economic  Advisors  [ 19961 
provides  a short  list  of the  various  pro-saving,  pro-investment,  or  anti- 
consumption  elements  of the  current  tax  code.  The  largest  of these  is pension 
fund  contributions,  followed  by  investment  in  machinery  and  equipment 
(which,  while  they  are  subject  to  some  taxation,  receive  favorable  treatment), 
and  life  insurance  savings  proceeds. 
This  again  begs  the  question:  How  much  saving  is  enough?  If the  tax 
code  is  already  tilting  people’s  behavior  in favor  of more  saving,  what 
independent  basis  is  there  to  allow  us to have  confidence  in  the  belief  that 
saving  is  currently  too  low ?  Comparisons  to our  own  history  or to  our  trading 
partners  do  not  address  that  question.  We  simply  do not  know  whether  or 
not  we  are  currently  saving  enough.  We  ought  to answer  that  question  before 
embarking  on  massive  social  experiments  of the  sort  being  contemplated  by 
Congressional  tax  planners  today. 
D.  Tax  Incentives,  Saving,  and  Unintended  Consequences 
Even  if one  were  certain  that  personal  saving  should  rise,  however, 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  tax  policy  aimed  at raising  saving  will  not  have 
perverse  effects.  Since  the  experiments  with  IRA’s  and  other  tax  innovations 
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achieved  through  the  introduction  of a tax  code  that  “encourages”  saving. 
Quite  the  opposite  is,  in  fact,  likely  to occur. 
The  basic  policy  idea  behind  an  anti-consumption  tax  is that  we  can 
cause  people  to  save  more  if we  offer  relatively  favorable  tax  treatment  to 
saving.  This  is true  both  of the  plans  that  totally  exempt  saving  from  tax 
(e.g.,  the  USATax,  as  written  by  Senators  Nunn  and  Domenici)  and  those 
that  merely  exempt  interest  on  saving  from  tax  (e.g.  a flat  tax).  In  either 
case,  the  purpose  is  to  decrease  the  cost  of saving.  In  the  cases  of tax 
exemptions  for  saving,  the  idea  is to reduce  the  “cost”  of one  dollar  of saving 
from  $1  (since,  currently,  consumption  and  saving  have  the  same  tax 
treatment,  and  hence  can  be  substituted  one-for-one)  to one  minus  the 
relevant  tax  rate  times  a dollar  (for  example,  eighty-five  cents,  if the  tax  rate 
is  15%).  In the  case  of an interest  exemption,  on the  other  hand,  the  idea  is to 
increase  the  cost  of consumption,  since  a higher  after-tax  return  on  saving 
would  imply  a greater  opportunity  cost  of consumption. 
As  a matter  of theory,  since  both  of these  plans  lower  the  cost  of saving 
relative  to  consumption,  these  ideas  are logically  equivalent.  No  matter  how 
it is  done,  the  point  is  that  you  can  supposedly  increase  saving  if you  give  it a 
higher  return.  If people  get  to keep  more  money  from  their  saving,  this  will 
encourage  them  to  spend  less  and  save  more. 
This  assumption  about  how  people  will  respond  to price  incentives  is 
most  easily  tested  by  imagining  that  the  inducement  to  saving  comes  from  a 
higher  rate  of interest  to be  earned  in  a simple  savings  account.  Since  there 
have  been  many  more  studies  on  the  interest-to-saving  connection  than  on 
the  taxes-to-saving  connection,  this  logical  equivalence  is very  useful.  Those 
studies  [e.g.,  Howrey  and  Hymans,  1978,  Campbell  and  Mankiw,  19891 come 
9 to the  near-unanimous  conclusion  that  raising  the  rate  of interest  on  savings 
accounts  (broadly  defined)  does  not  raise  saving;  indeed,  there  is  apparently 
no  reliable  connection  between  these  two  variables  at  all. 
Not  only  does  the  best  empirical  work  demonstrate  that  a better  return 
on  saving  does  not  increase  total  personal  saving,  but  even  the  most  standard 
microeconomic  theory  argues  that  this  should  not  be  at  all  surprising.  After 
all,  when  a person  is  faced  with  a better  return  (e.g.,  a higher  interest  rate) 
on  saving,  they  can  either  save  more  than  they  had  been  saving  (due  to their 
desire  not  to  miss  out  on  a good  deal,  or the  “substitution  effect”),  or they  can 
save  less  because  it is  not  necessary  to set  so much  aside  today  in  order  to 
have  the  same  amount  in the  future  (the  “income  effect”). 
Consider  the  following  numerical  example:  I put  $100  in  the  bank,  and 
the  interest  rate  is  5%,  meaning  that  I’ll have  $105  after  a year;  but  if the 
interest  rate  goes  to  lo%,  I can  save  $96  and  still  have  $105.60  a year  from 
now,  even  though  I have  reduced  my  saving  by  $4. 
Note  that  the  theory  does  not  say  that  people  will  definitely  save  less 
than  before,  only  that  it is unclear  what  people  will  do.  We  can  only  watch 
and  see  which  effect  will  dominate  in  the  real  economy;  and  the  empirical 
tests  make  clear  that  the  American  people  have  not  responded  to changes  in 
the  rate  of return  by  altering  their  rate  of saving  in a predictable  direction. 
In general,  at least  in  response  to changes  in  the  rate  of return,  they  do not 
alter  their  saving  at all. 
This  does  not  mean  that  people  are  unaware  of interest  rates  or of the 
tax  consequences  of their  decisions.  It merely  means  that,  while  they  try  to 
earn  the  best  return  that  they  can  on whatever  amount  of saving  they  plan  to 
do,  they  do  not  alter  their  total  level  of saving  in response  to these  incentives. 
The  best  example  of this  is  Individual  Retirement  Accounts  (IRA’s),  which 
10 were  invented  for  the  precise  purpose  of increasing  saving,  but  which  instead 
led  to  the  shifting  of funds  from  taxable  savings  accounts  into  IRA’s.  Indeed, 
the  aggregate  (measured)  U.S.  personal  saving  rate  continued  to  decline  in 
the  years  following  the  introduction  of IRA’s. 
The  recent  studies  on  saving  by,  for  example,  Campbell  and  Mankiw 
[ 19891,  and  Carroll  and  Samwick  I:  19951 and  others  also  indirectly  confirm 
this  behavioral  regularity.  They  find  that  people  are  so-called  “rule  of thumb” 
savers,  i.e.,  that  people  have  a simple  rule  to  determine  how  much  they  are 
going  to  save  (for  example,  a person  might  decide  to  save  $100  per  month), 
rather  than  calculating  and  responding  to changes  in  the  cost  of consumption 
and  the  returns  to  saving. 
Suppose,  however,  that  a tax  break  actually  did  increase  private  saving. 
This  is  still  not  sufficient  to make  the  plan  a success.  Since  national  saving 
includes  both  private  saving  and  government  saving,  it is  necessary  that  the 
increase  in  saving  more  than  make  up  for  any  tax  revenue  that  is lost  in  the 
effort  to give  savers  a tax  break.  In practice,  this  means  ensuring  that  an 
increase  in  private  saving  is not  merely  a reflection  of people  taking  their  tax 
cut  and  putting  only  a fraction  of it in the  bank.  Instead,  they  must  actually 
increase  the  amount  of their  saving  by  more  than  the  dollar  amount  of the  tax 
cut. 
This  also  makes  it  clear  that  any  plan  to increase  saving,  if it is  to 
continue  to  collect  the  same  amount  of revenue  as  the  current  system  (and 
thus  not  increase  the  fiscal  deficit),  must  hurt  someone  for  everyone  that  it 
helps.  If everyone  changed  their  behavior  toward  more  saving,  it would  not 
be  possible  to make  up  the  lost  tax  revenue.  This  implies  that  there  must  be 
a group  of people  whose  consumption  is non-responsive  to tax  changes,  while 
there  is  another  group  which  does  respond  to  tax  incentives.  The  tax  burden 
11 is then  shifted  onto  the  former  group.  It should  not  be  surprising  that  the 
latter  group  is  also  known  as  “high-income  households.” 
This  brings  into  sharp  focus  the  fact  that  pro-saving  taxes  have  the 
effect  of rewarding  high-income  people  for  the  saving  that  they  would  do even 
in  the  absence  of tax  incentives.  This  is discussed  in  more  detail  in  Buchanan 
[ 1996131. 
The  distributional  consequences  of taxing  consumption  are  likely  to 
have  a further  perverse  effect  on  saving.  There  is extremely  strong  evidence 
that  people-when  faced  with  difficult  economic  circumstances-will  devote 
extraordinary  amounts  of creativity  to maintaining  their  current  level  of 
consumption.  On  the  theoretical  level,  the  recent  work  on “loss  aversion” 
[see,  e.g.,  Thaler,  19921 indicates  that  people  view  absolute  declines  in  real 
income  as  unambiguously  worse  than  gains  of equivalent  magnitude  in their 
real  income.  Employing  experimental  and  survey  techniques,  Thaler  has 
concluded  that  losses  are  twice  as bad  as gains  of the  same  size  are  good. 
This  theory  is in  rough  accordance  with  the  older  “relative  income 
hypothesis”  [Duesenberry,  19491,  which  states  that  the  marginal  propensity 
to consume  is  substantially  lower  in  response  to declines  in income  than  it is 
to increases  in  income.  Under  either  theory,  raising  tax  rates  on  consumption 
will  not  have  a sizable  impact  on  consumption  because  people  will  fight  to 
continue  to  consume  what  they  have  grown  accustomed  to  consuming. 
Carrying  this  analysis  to the  empirical  level,  a recent  study  [Brown, 
19951 has  looked  at  the  twenty  years  of declining  real  incomes  for  middle-  and 
lower-middle-income  workers  in  the  United  States  between  the  early  1970s 
and  the  early  1990s.  The  evidence  shows  that  the  response  to lower  incomes 
has  been  to  decrease  saving  and  take  on more  consumer  debt,  a pattern  that 
was  not  interrupted  by  the  elimination  of the  tax  deductibility  of interest 
12 payments  on  consumer  loans.  While  this  is precisely  the  decline  in  net  saving 
that  so many  economists  are  decrying,  this  evidence  indicates  that  the 
decrease  in  saving  coincided  exactly  with  economic  changes  that  would 
normally  be  expected  to decrease  consumption,  i.e.,  lower  real  incomes  and 
adverse  tax  changes. 
This  evidence  indicates  forcefully  that  anti-consumption  taxes  are 
pointless:  people  have  already  spent  twenty  years  ignoring  declining  real 
income,  so why  would  they  respond  to a relatively  small  tax-induced  change 
in  the  relative  cost  of saving  and  consumption?  For  better  and  for  worse,  this 
is  a consumer&t  society.  Trying  to decrease  people’s  consumption  is  difficult- 
to-impossible  even  with  large,  direct  changes  in  the  variables  that  matter 
most.  Changes  in variables  that  are  only  indirectly  important  are  unlikely  to 
meet  with  greater  success. 
For  pro-saving  policies  to  meet  with  any  success,  therefore,  they  must 
be  designed  to  change  people’s  behavior  as  their  income  rises,  not  to 
reallocate  their  saving  and  spending  within  a stagnant  pie.  That  is,  people 
could  potentially  be  induced  to  save  a larger  fraction  of their  future  increases 
in  real  income  than  they  otherwise  would.  They  might  tenaciously  spend 
$30,900  per  year  from  a $31,000  net  income,  no  matter  what  the  tax  code 
does  to the  relative  price  of saving  and  investment;  but  an  increase  in  their 
net  income  to $34,000  might  allow  them  to respond  to tax  incentives, 
allocating  $500  of the  increase  to saving  rather  than,  say,  $50. 
This,  however,  requires  that  people’s  real  incomes  actually  rise,  which 
makes  it  all  the  more  important  not  to adopt  policies  that  intensify  the 
current  stagnation  of income.  A stagnant  economy  will  not  respond  to  saving 
incentives,  but  a prosperous  economy  might. 
To  summarize,  there  are  two  ways  that  one  might  hope  to  raise  the 
13 overall  rate  of personal  saving:  1)  Shift  income  from  the  non-savers  to the 
savers,  which  is  the  essence  of a regressive,  “trickle-down”  approach,  or 2) 
Induce  every  person  to save  more,  on average,  than  they  are  currently  saving. 
. 
In  order  to achieve  the  second  goal,  however,  one  cannot  simply  rely  on 
changing  the  relative  prices  of saving  and  consuming  through  adjustments  in 
the  tax  code.  Rather,  it is necessary  to create  prosperity  in both  the  short-run 
and  the  long-run. 
For  those  who  believe  that  the  only  path  to prosperity  is through  a 
higher  rate  of  saving,  this  appears  to be  a chicken-and-egg  problem:  saving 
can  only  rise  if  saving  rises.  However,  for  those  who  believe  that  it 
sometimes  makes  sense  to pursue  policies  in  the  short-run  that  one  would  not 
pursue  in  the  long-run,  the  question  is  how  to  change  the  policy  mix  in  order 
to increase  real  incomes. 
III.  The  Macroeconomics  of  Saving 
Based  on  the  arguments  in  Section  II, it is  apparent  that  there  is 
neither  a shortage  of  saving  nor  a reasonable  expectation  that  tax  changes 
can  induce  people  to  save  more  than  they  currently  do.  For  the  purposes  of 
this  section,  however,  both  of these  arguments  will  be  set  aside.  Instead,  this 
section  will  attempt  to  answer  the  following  question:  If  there  really  is  an 
inadequate  amount  of  saving  in  the  U.S.,  and  if the  tax  code  could  actually 
induce  people  to  save  more,  what  would  be the  consequences  of that  policy 
change? 
The  logic  in  favor  of savings  enhancement  has  been  repeated  so often 
that  it has  become  seemingly  unassailable.  Savings  creates  investment,  and 
investment  causes  growth.  It turns  out,  however,  that  this  straight-forward 
logic  is  not  as  reliable  as  it seems.  This  section  will  show  that  the  reasoning 
14 behind  the  desire  to increase  saving-even  if the  measurement  and  policy- 
effectiveness  issues  are  set  aside-is  questionable  at best. 
A.  The  Accounting  Identity 
The  desire  for  higher  national  saving  is not  defensible  because  saving  is 
an  end  in  itself.  Rather,  more  saving  is believed  to lead  to more  investment, 
which  will  presumably  lead  to higher  rates  of economic  growth  and,  thus,  to 
higher  standards  of living  for  all Americans.  The  analysis  must,  therefore, 
focus  not  on  saving  but  on investment  as  the  actual  variable  that  policy  is 
attempting  to increase.  The  first  step,  therefore,  is to  show  how  saving  and 
investment  are  related. 
A basic  macroeconomic  accounting  identity  demonstrates  that  the  sum 
of private  saving,  net  taxes,  and  imports  (known  collectively  as leakages  or 
withdrawals)  equals  the  sum  of private  investment,  government  purchases, 
and  exports  (together  called  injections).  This  identity  can  be  re-arranged  in 
any  number  of ways;  but  one  commonly-used  version  exploits  the  definitions 
of the  fiscal  deficit  (government  purchases  minus  net  taxes)  and  net  foreign 
investment  (exports  minus  imports,  or the  current  account  balance11  to 
demonstrate  that  private  saving  is equal  to private  domestic  investment  plus 
the  fiscal  deficit  plus  net  foreign  investment.  Subtracting  the  fiscal  deficit 
from  private  saving  defines  “national  saving,”  which  is  obviously  then  equal 
to private  domestic  investment  plus  net  foreign  investment. 
Once  the  accountants  set  up  the  definitions  of what  is measured  by  each 
1  Net  foreign  investment  is a devilishly  ambiguous  term.  It means  “net 
purchase  of foreign  assets  by  Americans,”  or the  net  amount  of money  loaned  to foreigners  by 
Americans  and  American-owned  companies. 
15 variable,  this  equation  must  hold.  This  equation  is  meaningless,  however, 
unless  one  understands  the  definitions  of each  of its  variables.  Four 
clarifications  are  in  order:  First,  while  the  only  type  of investment  that  might 
matter  for  economic  growth  is plant  and  equipment  (P&E)  spending,  private 
domestic  investment  in  the  context  of this  identity  includes  two  additional 
categories  of  spending:  businesses’  inventory  accumulations  (or,  when 
negative,  inventory  draw-downs)  and  residential  construction.  Therefore,  it 
is possible  that  “investment”  could  rise  in the  identity  without  implying  an 
increase  in  the  type  of investment  that  macroeconomists  believe  increases 
long-run  growth. 
Second,  national  saving  is the  sum  of private  saving  and  government 
saving;  and  government  saving  goes  down  when  tax  revenues  go  down.  As 
discussed  above,  it is not  enough  merely  to increase  private  saving;  the 
increase  in  private  saving  must  be larger  than  any  decrease  in  tax  revenues 
associated  with  the  saving-incentive  programs. 
Third,  recall  from  above  that  private  saving  includes  business  saving  as 
well  as  personal  saving.  It is not  sufficient  to look  at  the  effect  of a tax  plan 
on personal  saving  without  also  looking  at business  saving.  It turns  out  that 
business  saving  both  is  a more  important  determinant  of P&E  spending  and 
is very  likely  to be lowered  by  the  anti-consumption  tax  schemes. 
Fourth,  government  purchases  include  purchases  of both  consumer 
goods  (food  for  a government-run  cafeteria,  for  example)  and  investment 
goods  (a new  runway  for  a government-owned  airport).  Therefore,  this 
category  combines  both  consumption  (which  is presumed  to be  bad)  and 
investment  (which  is defined  to be  good). 
By  construction,  therefore,  any  increase  in  private  saving  must  be 
accompanied  by  more  private  domestic  investment,  more  net  foreign 
16 investment,  a higher  fiscal  deficit,  or some  combination  thereof.  A key 
question  for  policy  is the  proportions  in  which  these  variables  change.  For 
example,  if  any  increase  in.saving  were  to be  followed  by  an  exactly-matching 
increase  in  the  fiscal  deficit,  this  would  defeat  any  attempt  to increase  private 
investment.  (Note,  however,  that  it would  not  necessarily  defeat  the  purpose 
of increasing  total  investment,  since  the  higher  fiscal  deficit  might  have  been 
used  to  finance  investment  in  such  things  as public  infrastructure  and 
education.  > 
However,  sorting  out  the  likely  proportions  of the  changes  in  these 
variables  is beyond  the  scope  of this  simple  accounting  identity,  since  it is 
merely  a mathematical  fact  and  not  a behavioral  theory.  In algebraic  terms, 
the  existence  of this  identity  simply  says  that  the  six variables  under 
consideration  cannot  have  six  separate  behavioral  equations,  each 
independently  determining  the values  of those  variables.  At  most,  there  can 
only  be  five  behavioral  equations,  with  the  identity  closing  the  system  of 
equations.  While  this  is  an important  constraint,  it  says  absolutely  nothing 
further  about  the  relationships  among  the  six  variables.  One  goal  of 
macroeconomic  analysis,  therefore,  is to determine  the  nature  of the  behavior 
behind  these  variables. 
The  prevailing  orthodoxy  assumes  the  following  behavioral 
relationships:  we  can  assume  that  net  foreign  investment  and  the  fiscal 
deficit  are  exogenous,  which  leaves  a direct  relationship  between  private 
saving  and  private  domestic  investment.  Furthermore,  we  can  assume  that 
the  direction  of causality  is from  private  saving  to  private  investment. 
Saving,  therefore,  causes  investment.  This  means,  quite  naturally,  that  we 
can  increase  private  investment  by  enacting  policies  designed  to increase 
private  saving. 
17 While  this  conclusion  is often  stated  as if it were  the  only  possible 
conclusion  derivable  from  the  accounting  identity,  note  that  it in  fact  requires 
the  assumptions  that  four  variables  are  exogenous  (i.e.,  non-responsive  to 
changes  in  saving  and  investment)  and,  even  more  crucially,  that  the  two 
remaining  variables  have  a particular  cause-and-effect  relationship.  This  is 
now  a contestable  theory,  not  an undeniable  fact  deduced  from  accounting 
principles. 
However,  it is not  even  necessarily  true  that  policies  that  succeed  in 
increasing  desired  saving  by individuals  will  increase  saving  in  the 
aggregate.  (This  is  a separate  argument  from  above,  where  it was  argued 
that  no  one  might  even  want  to increase  their  saving  in  response  to tax 
incentives.)  In a classic  case  of the  fallacy  of composition,  it could  turn  out 
that  the  result  of everyone  trying  to increase  their  saving  is no increase  in 
total  saving  at  all. 
The  “paradox  of thrift”  argues  precisely  that.  When  people  try  to  save 
more,  businesses  sell  fewer  goods  (since  people  are  saving  instead  of 
spending).  This  results  in layoffs,  which  results  in people  having  less  income 
from  which  to  save.  In the  end,  investment  will  still  be  equal  to national 
saving,  but  neither  will  have  risen.  After  all,  why  would  businesses  invest  in 
new  machines  when  the  machines  they  already  have  are  producing  goods 
that  people  have  stopped  buying?  Thus,  the  paradox:  people  set  out  to save 
more,  and  end  up  saving  the  same  amount  of money  as  before.2 
2  Clearly,  this  could  even  result  in both  saving  and  investment  falling,  since 
businesses  might  reasonably  choose  to let  their  capital  depreciate  without  replacing  it  (i.e.,  a 
firm  might  engage  in  net  disinvestment).  Thus,  f%-ms might  decrease  their  gross  amount  of 
investment  below  even  their  earlier  plans.  This  would  make  the  level  of saving  fall  still 
18 This  means  that  saving  has  not  gone  up,  so investment  has  not  gone  up 
either.  Even  accepting  the  assumptions  summarized  above  (that  four 
variables  are  exogenous  and  that  saving  causes  investment),  the  model  still 
does  not  demonstrate  that  attempts  to increase  saving  will  actually  raise 
investment,  since  the  attempts  themselves  are  likely  to fail.  Given  that  the 
assumptions  themselves  are  highly  questionable  (as  discussed  below),  the 
usefulness  of this  model  is  seriously  compromised. 
B.  The  Financial  Connection 
What  is  conspicuously  lacking  in  the  preceding  analysis  is  an 
explanation  of the  causal  connection  between  saving  and  investment.  That 
is,  even  if one  were  willing  to concede  that  the  four  variables  that  comprise 
the  fiscal  deficit  and  net  foreign  investment  are  (at least  in  the  aggregate) 
exogenous,  why  does  more  saving  systematically  result  in  more  investment? 
A theory  of investment  behavior-preferably,  of P&E  investment  behavior- 
is necessary. 
Fipure  1:  The  Standard  View  of Cuttiny  Taxes  on  Saving 
The  most  prominent  theory,  enshrined  in the  textbooks,  is  summarized 
in Figure  1.  Step  1, in  which  lowering  the  tax  rate  on  saving  results  in  more 
further,  to match the decrease in total investment. 
19 saving  both  individually  and  in  the  aggregate,  has  been  dealt  with  above.  It 
is  Steps  2 and  3 that  constitute  the  orthodox  view  of saving  and  investment: 
more  saving  will  cause  interest  rates  to go  down,  and  lower  interest  rates  will 
cause  investment  to rise.  This  theory  is logically  superior  to the  investment- 
equals-national-saving  identity  in  that  it actually  is based  on  a notion  of 
cause-and-effect.  In addition,  the  cause-and-effect  story  is intuitively 
believable:  more  money  is being  saved,  so banks  don’t  have  to pay  as  much 
interest  on  their  depositors’  accounts,  which  allows  them  to charge  lower 
interest  rates  on loans  to firms,  who  are  only  too  happy  to accept  the  loans  to 
spend  on investment  goods. 
Simply  having  a theory  does  not,  however,  mean  that  the  theory  is true. 
This  one,  evidence  indicates,  is  false  both  at Step  2 and  Step  3.  The  failure  of 
either  step  to work,  of course,  means  that  the  policy  will  fail.  Since  these  tax 
plans  are  based  on  such  an  elegant  chain  of causality,  their  effectiveness 
rides  on  each  step  in  the  causal  process  working  exactly  as  advertised. 
Unfortunately,  there  is good  reason  to  doubt  that  any  of them  will  do  so. 
Step  2 is  false  because  interest  rate  are  determined,  at least  in  their 
direction  if not  their  level,  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  The  overall  liquidity  in 
the  system  is the  primary  determinant  of interest  rates,  and  the  Fed  can 
counter-act  any  changes  in  overall  liquidity  that  a tax  change  might  cause. 
Therefore,  the  usual  notion  that  more  saving  can  lower  interest  rates  ignores 
the  effect  of liquidity  injections  and  withdrawals  by  the  central  bank. 
The  second  half  of this  theory  of investment  (Step  3) is the  basis  of one 
of the  most  fundamental  debates  in  all of macroeconomics:  are  interest  rates 
(or,  more  broadly,  the  cost  of capital)  inversely  related  to investment?  A 
strong  answer  to this  is  provided  by  the  following  collection  of quotations 
from  various  macroeconomic  theorists: 
20 “One  of the  best-established  facts  in macroeconomics  is that  business  fixed 
investment  and  output  move  strongly  together  over  the  business  cycle.  By 
contrast,  investment  and  the  cost  of capital  are  either  uncorrelated  or only 
weakly  correlated.” 
Shapiro  [1986,  p.  1111 
“It  is  well-known  from  the  work  on investment  theory..  .that  an  analysis  of 
profit-maximizing  behavior..  . can at most  offer  a relationship  between  the 
desired  stock  of capital  and  the  rate  of interest,  but  not  a relationship 
between  the  desired  rate  of increase  in the  stock  of capital  and  the  rate  of 
interest.  . . . Demand  for  a finite  addition  to the  stock  of capital  can  lead  to any 
rate  of  investment.” 
Foley  and  Sidrauski  11970,  p. 441 
“. . .[Rleal  output  emerges  as the  most  important  single  determinant  of 
investment  expenditures.  Considered  as  a competing  model  of investment, 
the  profits  . . . model  . . . is definitely  inferior.  . . .  The  introduction  of financial 
considerations  . . . necessitates  substantial  modification  of the  . . . model.” 
Jorgenson  11971,  p.  11411 
‘While  standard  economic  theory  predicts  a link  between  capital  costs  and 
investment,  the  theory  in its  most  general  form  does  not  make  any 
quantitative  predictions  about  how  strong  the  link  will  be.  Although  some 
empirical  work  has  addressed  this  issue,  the  results  to  date  have  been  mixed. 
. . . The  most  important  determinant  of investment  is the  strength  of the 
economy.” 
Fazzari  11993,  pp.  lo-111 
‘I.. .lIlt  appears  that  investment  is most  sensitive  to quantity  variables 
(output  or sales)  with  price  variables  having  only  modest  effects.” 
Chirinko  11993,  p.  18831 
The  available  evidence,  then,  does  not  support  the  notion  that  lower 
interest  rates  will  increase  investment.  Notice  that  the  statements  above  are 
not  saying  merely  that  the  state  of the  economy  is  more  important  than 
interest  rates  in influencing  investment;  rather,  the  state  of the  economy  is 
the  only thing  that  significantly  effects  investment,  while  the  effect  of 
interest  rates  (even  holding  the  state  of the  economy  constant)  is  small  or 
non-existent. 
This  lack  of  success  in finding  a connection  between  interest  rates  (or 
the  cost  of capital)  and  real  investment  has  only  encouraged  researchers  to 
21 look  harder.  One  of the  recent  trends  in  this  area  of research  has  been 
deriving  and  testing  so-called  Euler  Equations  of investment  [the  earliest 
example  being  Abel,  19801.  This  is done  by  hypothesizing  how  a typical  firm 
would  maximize  the  expected  present  value  of real  future  profits,  which 
allows  one  to  derive  mathematically  how  a firm  would  respond  to  changes  in 
key  variables  when  deciding  how  much  to invest. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  Euler  Equations  derived  from  such  a mental 
exercise  indicate  that  investment  decisions  should  depend  crucially  on the 
cost  of capital  in  determining  investment.  The  acid  test  is to  see  whether 
these  derived  equations  actually  match  the  data  well.  It turns  out  that  they 
do  not.  A recent  review  by  several  researchers  who  have  been  active  in  the 
development  of such  models  [Oliner,  Rudebusch,  and  Sichel,  19951  of the 
empirical  research  to  date  on Euler  Equations  concluded,  in  fact,  that  Euler- 
equation  models  are  worse  at predicting  investment  than  even  the 
unsatisfactory  cost-of-capital  models  that  they  were  designed  to replace.3 
Moreover,  it is  still  the  case  that  the  state  of the  economy  predicts  investment 
behavior  better  than  any  models  that  rely  on the  interest  rate  as  a 
determinant  of investment. 
It turns  out,  however,  that  interest  rates  do matter  for  non-P&E 
investment,  especially  residential  construction.  This  leaves  open  the 
possibility  that  the  interest  rate  could  indirectly  affect  P&E  investment,  by 
improving  the  state  of the  economy  and  thus  P&E.  This  effect  has  been 
tested  by  Fazzari  [1993],  who  concludes  that  this  effect  is too  small  to  offset 
the  negative  impact  of lower  internal  cash  flow  in  determining  the  level  of 
3  This  is true  even  of Euler  Equation  models  derived  with  “time-to-build” 
structures  included  in  the  model. 
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Even  if saving  caused  investment,  it is  not  true  that  plant  and 
equipment  investment  (which,  again,  is the  real  focus  of these  policies)  is 
financed  by  personal  saving.  As  mentioned  above,  the  vast  majority  of P&E 
is  financed  with  a business’s  own  internal  funds  [see,  for  example,  Fazzari, 
19931.  Personal  saving  is  unimportant  to this  aspect  of investment;  so 
attempts  to  raise  personal  saving  will  not  raise  P&E  spending.  Another  way 
to look  at  the  Paradox  of Thrift,  in fact,  is to  observe  that  increases  in 
personal  saving  will  lead  to decreases  in business  saving,  since  firms  will  not 
have  any  earnings  to retain  if everyone  tries  to  save  more.  Repealing  the 
entire  tax  code  in  order  to make  household  saving  rise,  therefore,  completely 
misses  the  point. 
Finally,  there  is  also  the  question  of whether  the  magnitudes  of the 
various  changes  will  be  large  enough  to have  a meaningful  impact  on future 
economic  growth.  That  is,  even  if changes  in the  tax  code  actually  did  cause 
all  of the  variables  to  change  in the  directions  that  proponents  of these  tax 
plans  imagine  they  will,  will  the  size  of the  changes  make  the  political  effort 
worthwhile?  Almost  certainly  not.  It turns  out  that  it would  take  a huge 
increase  in  saving  to  have  any  appreciable  effect  on growth: 
“Studies  of what  makes  the  U.S.  economy  grow  find  repeatedly  that 
technological  innovation  and  improvements  in the  skills  of  the  work  force  are 
six  to  seven  times  more  important  than  business  investment  in  plant  and 
equipment  in  promoting  higher  productivity,  growth,  and  incomes.  As  a 
result  . . . , [tlo  achieve  a permanent  1 percentage  point  increase  in  the 
economy’s  growth  rate,  we  would  have  to nearly  triple  our  current  saving 
rate.” 
Shapiro  [1996,  p.  14-15,  emphasis  in  original] 
To  put  this  into  perspective,  the  U.S.  rate  of personal  saving  as  a 
percentage  of disposable  personal  income  was  5.1%  in  the  first  quarter  of 
1995.  The  highest  that  rate  has  ever  been  (in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1973)  was 
23 10.7%,  or  slightly  more  than  double  the  recent  level.  The  average  over  the 
last  thirty  years  has  been  6.5%,  so that  it would  be  necessary  to increase  the 
personal  saving  rate  to  19.5%  in  order  to increase  the  rate  of growth  of the 
economy  from  2.5%  to  3.5%.  If one  is looking  at the  total  rate  of private 
saving  (as  a percentage  of GDP),  the  rate  in  early  1995  was  16.1%,  whereas 
the  highest  it had  ever  been  since  1970  was  20.7%  in  1975:2.  We  would  have 
to increase  total  private  saving  rates  to nearly  50%  to have  an  appreciable 
impact  on  GDP  growth  rates. 
This  means  that  Step  4 in the  figure  above  might  well  be  true  (and  it 
even  gives  the  benefit  of the  doubt  to Steps  2 and  3),  but  the  size  of the  effect 
is not  large  enough  to  matter.  Even  if we were  to get  higher  saving  and 
investment  from  a change  in  the  tax  code,  therefore,  the  impact  on  people’s 
incomes  is likely  to be  quite  small.  Looked  at  differently,  political  and 
economic  resources  would  be  better  spent  in  finding  ways  to increase 
innovation  and  workers’  skills,  rather  than  radically  altering  the  tax  system 
(and  the  distribution  of income)  in pursuit  of-at  best-a  numerically- 
insignificant  increase  in  growth. 
C.  The Short Run, the Long Run, and Monetary  Policy 
Confronted  with  the  notion  of the  Paradox  of Thrift,  the  standard 
response  from  mainstream  economists  (at least  those  trained  in  the  United 
States)  is  that  the  paradox  is,  at most,  a short-run  phenomenon.  Since  the 
economy  will  move  in  the  long  run  to a technically-dictated  level  of “full- 
employment  equilibrium,”  lower  spending  (i.e.,  more  saving)  cannot  result  in 
lower  output  in  the  long  run.  This  implies  that  what  happens  along  any 
particular  adjustment  path  cannot  affect  the  long-run  levels  of investment, 
output,  growth,  etc.  The  economy  is assumed  to be  “path  independent.” 
24 What  would  be  required  to make  the  economy  impervious  to 
contractionary  fiscal  policy,  at least  in  the long  run?  Stated  differently,  how 
can  you  end  up  with  exactly  the  same  capital  stock  that  you  would  have  had, 
despite  the  occasional  short-run  downward  blip  in  investment?  Clearly,  there 
must  be  periods  when  investment  is greater  than  it would  otherwise  be,  to 
balance  out  the  average  rate  of investment  over  time. 
If investment  is  responsive  to  swings  in  the  economy  rather  than  to 
changes  in  the  cost  of capital-as  the  empirical  evidence  shows  so  strongly- 
this  further  implies  that  output  must  occasionally  operate  above  its  long-run 
level,  at levels  high  enough  and  for periods  long  enough  to generate  sufficient 
excess  investment.  One  simple  way  to “prove”  that  this  is how  the  U.S. 
economy  actually  works  is  simply  to define  the  long-run  potential  of the 
economy  to be  equal  to its  trend  value  over  any  period  of recent  history,  so 
that  the  time  pattern  of GDP  is  constructed  with  half  of actual  output  levels 
above  trend  and  half  below.  If, and  this  is  a very  big  if, investment  responds 
symmetrically  on both  sides  of “full  employment”  (thus  defined),  the  problem 
is  solved.  Average  investment  is  unaffected  by  the  existence  of occasional 
downward  swings  in  investment. 
Any  non-tautological  method  of defining  full  employment,  however,  has 
a much  harder  time  proving  that  short-run  drops  in investment  have  no 
permanent  effects.  Simply  relying  on  the  notion  that  the  economy’s  long-run 
tendency  is toward  full  employment,  as  contentious  as  that  claim  is,  does  not 
prevent  the  economy  from  being  moved  onto  a permanently  lower  growth 
path  by  the  occasional  loss  of capital  accumulation.  In that  case,  the  economy 
can  be  made  cumulatively  poorer  over  time  by  short-run  deviations  from  full 
employment.  (Whether  this  will  affect  the  long  run  growth  rate,  rather  than 
the  long  run  level  of  GDP,  depends  on whether  growth  rates  are  path 
25 dependent.  At  the  very  least,  however,  it is  clear  that  living  standards  can  be 
permanently  lowered  through  contractionary  fiscal  policy.) 
Any  realistic  discussion  of the  time  path  of investment  and  output 
must,  however,  look  seriously  at monetary  policy’s  response  to the  proposed 
change  in  fiscal  policy  (which  is what  sets  the  process  in  motion).  Will  the 
Federal  Reserve  respond  to the  downward  trend  of output  and  investment  by 
easing  monetary  policy?  Current  Fed  Chair  Alan  Greenspan  has  promised  as 
much  on  several  occasions. 
In  theory,  the  Fed  could  certainly  try  to coordinate  its  actions  with  any 
change  in  fiscal  policy,  with  any  policy  error  being  of unknown  sign  and 
duration.  If it  erred  toward  too  much  countervailing  stimulus,  the  economy 
could  experience  a brief  period  of over-investment,  with  the  likelihood  of 
inflationary  pressures  causing  the  Fed  to tighten  later. 
If, instead,  the  Fed  erred  in not  providing  enough  stimulus,  the 
economy  would  experience  lower-than-full-employment  growth  levels.  How 
would  the  Fed  then  respond  to this?  In order  for  no  cumulative  effects  to 
remain  from  the  short-run  recession,  the  Fed  would  have  to  change  policy  in 
the  future  to  allow  a short-run  boom  to develop. 
There  is,  however,  another  possible  response.  Since  its  current  stated 
long-run  goal  is  to  create  a zero-inflation  environment,  the  Fed  is in  an 
interesting  position.  If it wants  actively  to induce  a lower  inflation  rate,  it 
must  create  a recession.  (Yes,  the  Fed  does  believe  in the  Phillips  Curve.) 
This  can  generate  unwanted  political  heat,  accompanied  by  Congressional 
attempts  to  restrict  the  independence  of the  Fed. 
Therefore,  the  Fed  could  adopt  what  has  been  called  an “opportunistic” 
monetary  policy.  The  Fed  could  view  this  fiscally-induced  recession  as  a 
fortunate  brake  on  economic  growth,  not  to be  counteracted  but  in  fact 
26 exploited.  The  recession,  since  it was  caused  by  tax  policy,  cannot  be  blamed 
on the  Fed;  the  Fed  can  then  delay  its  stimulative  response  in  the  hope  that 
the  inflation  rate  will  drop  from  its  current  level  of slightly  less  than  3%, 
down  to  2%,  l%,  or ideally  0%. 
Indeed,  there  is  some  evidence  that  this  is the  policy  rule  currently  used 
by  the  Fed.  Orphanides  and  Wilcox  [1996],  while  not  claiming  to  know  that 
the  decision-makers  at the  Fed  use  the  opportunistic  approach,  offer  some 
revealing  quotations  from  current  and  former  voting  members  of the  Fed’s 
policy-making  committee.  Orphanides  and  Wilcox  also  demonstrate  a model 
of opportunistic  monetary  policy,  showing  that  it is logically  coherent. 
Another  possibility  is that  the  Fed  targets  the  growth  rate  of output  in 
determining  its  policy  actions.  Current  consensus  is  that  the  Fed  views  a 
2.5%  annual  real  growth  rate  as  the  maximum  possible  for  a sustained  period 
of time.  If that  were  a long-run  average  goal,  once  again  the  possibility  of 
balance  would  exist,  with  periods  of boom  and  bust  both  allowed  to exist  but 
not  get  out  of hand.  However,  as  seems  more  likely,  if the  2.5%  growth  rate  is 
seen  as  a maximum  rate  above  which  the  economy  cannot  be  allowed  to 
accelerate,  then  the  same  result  will  hold  as  under  the  assumption  that  the 
Fed  is  targeting  a decrease  in the  inflation  rate.  Once  again,  the  cumulative 
effect  will  be  lower  output  and  investment. 
Recall,  however,  that  the  whole  point  of the  tax  policy  is to raise  saving, 
raise  investment,  and  thereby  raise  the  rate  of long-term  potential  growth  of 
the  economy.  Even  assuming  that  the  Feds  policy  works  perfectly,  that  the 
economy  does  not  move  into  recession,  and  that  investment  becomes  a larger 
share  of output,  the  Fed  is nevertheless  in  the  difficult  position  of having  to 
determine  when  the  long-run  potential  growth  rate  has  risen  above  2.5%,  and 
to what  level  it has  risen.  Two  problems,  one  common  to  all  policy  situations 
27 and  one  unique  to  this  question,  will  plague  this  reaction. 
First,  there  is  a recognition  lag  in  determining  that  the  economy’s 
potential  growth  rate  has  increased.  Even  a Fed  that  allowed  the  economy  to 
average  its  potential  growth  rate  would  end  up  holding  the  growth  rate  below 
its  new  potential  until  the  new  potential  had  been  recognized,  measured,  and 
verified.  Second,  the  restrictive  bias  of current  Fed  policy  comes  into  play 
once  again.  This  bias  will  argue  strongly  for  waiting  until  there  is virtually 
no  doubt  that  the  potential  growth  rate  has  risen,  and  it will  also  argue  for 
adopting  the  lowest  available  estimate  of the  range  of estimates  of the  new 
target  rate.  Throughout  this  process,  therefore,  the  tendency  toward 
contraction  will  make  itself  felt-not  just  in immediate-term  interest  rate 
policy,  but  in  every  decision  involved  in the  transition  to  a higher  growth 
path.  That  path,  then,  will  be  lower  than  it could  be  under  different 
circumstances. 
Finally,  there  is  a problem  with  the  methods  used  to measure  the 
economy’s  potential  growth  rate.  The  discussion  above  implied  that  there  is 
an  independent  process  of measurement  which  would  produce  a range  of 
estimates  of the  change  in  potential  growth  rates.  In fact,  however,  the 
process  is  not  independent  of actual  growth  rates.  The  future  growth 
potential  of the  economy  is inferred,  in part,  from  actual  recent  growth  rates, 
with  changes  in  other  factors  adding  to or subtracting  from  that  average.  In 
that  case,  the  problem  of tautologically  defining  potential  growth  becomes 
quite  serious.  Slow  growth  could  then  beget  slow  growth. 
While  the  foregoing  is largely  a critique  of monetary  policy,  and  not 
specifically  a discussion  about  tax  policy,  in practice  the  two  are  inseparable. 
Tax  policy  has  impacts  on the  macroeconomy,  and  the  Fed  then  reacts  or fails 
to react.  It is the  likelihood  of non-  and  under-reactions  that  makes 
28 contractionary  fiscal  policies  so potentially  damaging. 
Iv.  Conclusions 
The  desire  to change  the  tax  code  is understandable.  The  system  is 
currently  complicated  and,  often,  perverse.  However,  there  is no  need  to re- 
write  the  entire  tax  code  in order  to encourage  more  saving.  There  is no 
reliable  evidence  to indicate  that  current  levels  of saving  are  inadequate,  nor 
is  there  any  guidance  available  as to what  the  optimum  amount  of  saving 
should  be. 
The  tax  system  already  encourages  saving  and  investment  in  a number 
of significant  ways.  More  importantly,  though,  there  is no  evidence  that 
changing  the  tax  code  in  supposedly  saving-enhancing  ways  will  actually 
raise  saving.  People  can  be very  ingenious  when  they  want  to maintain  their 
levels  of consumption,  and  the  tax  code  cannot  prevent  this.  Saving  is simply 
not  responsive  to the  tax  system. 
This  is  actually  fortunate,  because  if a tax  change  did  increase  saving, 
the  economy  would  be  made  worse  off.  The  decline  in  consumption  spending 
would  at least  slow  the  economy  down,  if it did  not  induce  an  outright 
recession.  Moreover,  the  current  conduct  of monetary  policy  is  such  that  this 
contractionary  impact  induced  by  tax  policy  would  not  be  offset  by  monetary 
stimulus. 
In  short,  saving-inducing  tax  plans  are  attacking  a problem  that  does 
not  exist,  with  a mechanism  that  will  not  work,  in  order  to achieve  a goal  that 
would  harm  the  economy.  It would  be  much  better  to design  tax  policy  to 
achieve  other  goals,  such  as raising  revenue  and  redistributing  income. 
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